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Impact bias in student evaluations of higher education
Anthony Grimes*, Dominic Medway, Adrienne Foos† and Anna Goatman
Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Booth Street West, Manchester M15
6PB, UK
In the context of higher education, this study examines the extent to which affective
evaluations of the student experience are influenced by the point at which they are
made (i.e. before the experience begins, whilst it is happening and after it has
ended). It adopts a between-groups quantitative analysis of the affective
evaluations made by 360 future, current and past postgraduate students of a UK
business school. The study validates the proposition that affective forecasts and
memories of the student experience are considerably inflated in prospect and
retrospect; a finding that implies a significant impact bias. It is concluded that
the impact bias may have important implications for influencing the effectiveness
of student decision-making, the timing and comparability of student course
evaluations, and understanding the nature and effects of word-of-mouth
communication regarding the student experience.
Keywords: student attitudes; student evaluation; student expectations; student
experience; students’ perceptions
Introduction
In recent years, the student experience has become a topic of growing interest and
importance in higher education (HE). Accordingly, student evaluations of courses
and institutions are now commonplace, with results feeding into various metrics, per-
formance indicators and rankings of institutional excellence. The increased focus on
the student experience in HE has been accompanied by significant academic research
on the matter. This work is largely characterised by a focus on what students think
about aspects of their education experience and the services their university provides
(Brookes 2003; Bryant 2006). By contrast, others argue that what is required are
studies that are considerate of the affective nature of the student experience (Beard,
Clegg, and Smith 2007), and the relationship between this and student expectations
(Miller, Bender, and Schuh 2005).
These latter perspectives lead towards the literature on affective forecasting. Here,
evidence has begun to accumulate for a phenomenon called the impact bias. This refers
to a tendency for people to overestimate the intensity and duration of their emotional
reactions to future and past events. It has been demonstrated in a wide range of contexts
(e.g. politics, health and sport; see Wilson and Gilbert 2003), and may have important
implications for understanding and shaping the experience of students in HE.
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The contribution of the current study lies in its examination of the existence, nature
and extent of the impact bias in an HE context. We extend the current literature by com-
paring students’ forecasts, perceptions and memories of their affective experience
whilst undertaking an HE course. This differs from existing work on student evalu-
ations of HE in two ways: First, it is concerned with how students feel during (and
about) their HE experience (i.e. affective evaluation), rather than what they think
about certain aspects of it (i.e. cognitive judgements, such as satisfaction). Second,
our study moves beyond previous research by demonstrating the difficulties students
may have in forecasting and remembering their feelings, and considering the impli-
cations of this for the effectiveness of student decision-making, the timing and compar-
ability of course evaluations, and the nature and impact of word-of-mouth
communication about the HE experience.
Our paper begins with a review of the extant literature regarding: (i) subjective well-
being (SWB), cognition and affect in evaluations of the HE student experience; (ii) the
impact bias in affective evaluations; and (iii) the nature and measurement of the impact
bias in an HE context. Six hypotheses are formulated and tested via a study of 360 post-
graduates at a major UK business school. These respondents comprise three groups of
students: prospective (i.e. those about to start a small number of content-related MSc
courses), current (i.e. those undertaking the courses, and specifically at the time the
teaching ends and a dissertation is in progress) and past (i.e. alumni from the last
five years of the courses concerned). This approach allows for a comparison of fore-
casted (n = 115), perceived (n = 70) and remembered (n = 175) affective experience.
Following a presentation of results, we conclude with a discussion of the HE manage-
ment implications that might be associated with the impact bias in student evaluations
of their affective experience.
SWB, cognition and affect in evaluations of the HE student experience
Concepts such as happiness, satisfaction and well-being are sometimes assumed to be
one and the same (Easterlin 2003). However, for our paper it is necessary to define and
examine the relationship between these concepts more closely. A salient study, in this
respect, is that of Diener, Scollon, and Lucas (2003), who ‘review the components that
make up the domain of subjective well-being’ (191), and present them in a conceptual
hierarchy with various levels of specificity (see Figure 1). In so doing, they identify
SWB as a superordinate construct determined by four conceptually related but empiri-
cally separable components: ‘positive affect, negative affect, [life] satisfaction, and
domain satisfaction’ (Diener, Scollon, and Lucas 2003, 191). The first two components
(positive and negative affect) relate to emotional responses to life events, the aggre-
gated outcome of which is termed ‘affective well-being’ (Diener, Scollon, and Lucas
2003, 195). The third and fourth components (life and domain satisfaction) refer to
the largely cognitive judgements people make about their life and aspects of it. Each
component contains further sub-categories of discrete emotions (e.g. happiness and
worry) with respect to affect (positive or negative), and specific criteria (e.g. fulfilment
and meaning) with regard to satisfaction (life or domain-specific).
With respect to Figure 1, academic studies of the HE experience have tended to
focus on measuring domain satisfaction, and in particular the level and determinants
of students’ satisfaction with their teaching, learning and wider university experience
(see Duarte, Raposo, and Alves 2012). Some have also examined the ‘life satisfaction’
of students (Chow 2005; Bedggood and Donovan 2012), and others the relationship
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between expectations and perceptions of university experiences or services (Booth
1997; Oldfield and Baron 2000; Sander et al. 2000; Voss, Gruber, and Szmigin
2007; Nicholson et al. 2013; Wilson et al. 2013).
However, few studies have specifically sought to investigate the affective experi-
ence of HE students, despite the efforts of Beard, Clegg, and Smith (2007) to stimulate
this. One notable exception is the work of Trigwell, Ellis, and Han (2012), in which
student learning approaches (surface vs. deep) are correlated with the valence of
their emotional experience (i.e. negative vs. positive). Specifically, their work identifies
that students experiencing positive emotions, such as hope and pride, are more likely to
adopt a deeper approach to learning and achieve higher performance outcomes. By con-
trast, those who more strongly experience negative emotions, such as anger, boredom,
anxiety and shame, are more likely to adopt surface learning approaches and achieve
relatively lower performance outcomes. Most recently, Chong and Ahmed (2015)
have also examined the moderating influence of students’ feelings about their perform-
ance outcomes on their subsequent perceptions of the university service quality experi-
ence. In this study, however, affective responses to a discrete element of the student
experience were considered only to the extent that they were then used as information
in the subsequent construction of cognitive judgements. This illustrates the importance
of affective well-being, not only as a component of SWB in its own right, but also as
one determinant of the other component of SWB: life/domain satisfaction. As Diener,
Scollon, and Lucas (2003, 197) note, ‘people use their affective well-being as [one
piece of] information when judging their life satisfaction’.
Acknowledging the importance of affective well-being and responding to calls for a
greater focus on this topic within the HE literature (Beard, Clegg, and Smith 2007), our
paper is concerned with how students conceive of their affective experience, both gen-
erally (i.e. how they ‘feel’) and with respect to their programme of study (i.e. how they
‘feel about’ their educational experiences at university). However, in order to develop a
holistic appreciation of affective experience, and how it may inform cognitive judge-
ments and future behaviour, it is necessary to study how emotion is experienced in
the three faculties of mind: imagination, perception and memory (Gilbert 2007). As
Diener, Scollon, and Lucas (2003) note, affective well-being is not simply the
product of emotion as it is experienced in the moment, but rather the memories that
people have of their emotional experience. In support of this, they draw attention to
Figure 1. Conceptualising the relationships between happiness, affect, satisfaction and well-
being (Adapted from Diener, Scollon, and Lucas 2003, 192).
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research which suggests behaviour is better predicted by memory for emotions, rather
than current emotional experience (Wirtz et al. 2003). In an HE context, affective
memory may thus shape the subjective well-being, attitudes, decisions and behaviours
of existing students and alumni. Furthermore, it is necessary to examine how people
imagine they will feel in the future, as many important decisions are made on this
basis (Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 2003), including those made by prospective and
current HE students. However, both ‘affective forecasts’ and ‘affective memories’
may be subject to a significant impact bias.
Impact bias in affective evaluations
Impact bias refers to a human tendency to overestimate emotional responses to events
and experiences. It is demonstrated primarily in the social psychology literature on
affective forecasting and is manifest in two forms; an intensity bias and a durability
bias (see Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson 2005). Populations as diverse as sports fans
and medical patients have been found to overestimate how they will feel, and for
how long, on learning the outcome of football games and medical tests, respectively;
and to do so for both positive and negative affective experiences (for a review, see
Wilson and Gilbert 2003). Furthermore, the impact bias has been found to occur in
both prospect and retrospect. Thus, people tend to overestimate how intense and per-
sistent their emotional experience will be in the future, but also how intense and persist-
ent it was in the past (Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 2003).
A seminal demonstration of the positive and negative impact bias, in both prospect
and retrospect, was provided by Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert (2003). At the point at
which a recount was called in the US presidential election of 2000, supporters of the
two candidates (George Bush and Al Gore) were asked to predict how they would
feel in the event of victory or defeat for their preferred candidate. When the result
was declared in favour of Bush (four weeks later) his supporters were found to have
overestimated how happy they would feel at that point. Similarly, supporters of Gore
had overestimated the negative feelings they would experience at the moment of
defeat. Having validated the impact bias in prospect, however, the authors went on
to demonstrate that the same voters had almost returned to their pre-election levels
of overestimation when asked to remember how they thought they had felt on the
day the result was declared (four weeks earlier). The same pattern of results was
then observed in a laboratory study in which participants were required to predict
and remember how good/bad they would feel after performing well or poorly in a
test of social aptitude (Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 2003).
Theoretical explanations for the impact bias converge on the idea that it is the
product of a focusing illusion and/or a failure to anticipate how quickly and fully we
will adapt to unfolding events (Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson 2005). Within this
context, the most prominent and influential explanation relates to focalism; the ten-
dency to think too much about the event or experience in question, and too little
about contextual factors that are likely to occupy attention and thus temper the intensity
and duration of emotional response to the focal event (see Wilson et al. 2000; Wilson
and Gilbert 2005). For example, the emotional high experienced by football fans in the
immediate aftermath of a much anticipated victory might be tempered by all manner of
everyday factors related to family, work, health, weather, etc. Failure to anticipate the
moderating influence of context on emotional experience is thus considered to be one of
the main reasons for the impact bias (Wilson et al. 2000).
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However, focalism does not imply that people are incapable of considering non-
focal events and the moderating influence of context on their future/past feelings.
Rather, it is the case that they often do not take these things into account. Specifically,
Wilson et al. (2000) propose that the impact bias occurs because people place greater
emphasis on information that is easily accessible (e.g. that relating to the focal event)
than that which is not (e.g. that relating to all manner of contextual factors that may or
may not arise). Indeed, when people are directed to consider the broader context in
which a future event will impact on their emotions, their tendency towards overestima-
tion is considerably reduced (Wilson et al. 2000).
In addition to focalism, the impact bias for negative experiences may also occur on
the basis of a second, simultaneous, non-conscious mechanism called immune neglect.
This relates to the notion that people are unaware that negative experiences will activate
an assortment of defence mechanisms and coping strategies that will enable them to
rationalise and reconstrue the events in question (see Gilbert et al. 1998).
The impact bias is also likely to be moderated by time. Specifically, it might be
expected to be larger for events and experiences in the distant future/past. This may
be the result of a waning psychological immune system (in the case of negative experi-
ences) and/or a heightened degree of focalism (for both positive and negative experi-
ences; see Wilson et al. 2000). Furthermore, people do not appear to learn from their
affective experience and continue to exhibit inaccurate forecasts of future emotions
(both positive and negative), despite the fact that these have been shown to be overes-
timations in the past (Meyvis, Ratner, and Levav 2010).
The only notable challenge to the impact bias thesis is from Levine et al. (2012).
They raise the possibility that the impact bias may be a product of a ‘procedural arte-
fact’, whereby forecasters are often asked to think specifically about the impact of an
event on their feelings (e.g. ‘how will you feel following the outcome of an event?’),
while experiencers are asked to consider their feelings more generally (e.g. ‘how do
you feel at this point in time?’). However, Wilson and Gilbert (2013) provide a
robust rebuttal of this argument on both theoretical and methodological grounds.
Specifically, they cite a series of studies in which the attention of all participants has
been drawn to the event in question at each stage of evaluation, and/or great care has
been taken to ensure the apparent impact bias is not due to respondents’ confusion
as to the meaning of the questions they were asked (Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert
2003; Wilson et al. 2004).
Examining impact bias in an HE context
Academic research suggests that students generally conceive of their university experi-
ence to be positive (Brookes 2003; Chow 2005). Moreover, results of the UK’s most
recent Postgraduate Taught Experience Survey (PTES) mirror those of the UK National
Student Survey (of undergraduates) in suggesting that more than 80% of students
regard their overall experience positively, with just 9% reporting a negative view (Soi-
lemetzidis, Bennett, and Leman 2014). Given the dominance of positive valence in
studies and surveys of the student experience, it should be possible to demonstrate
how the impact bias influences student evaluations from a ‘mean perspective’ (i.e. to
predict that the mean intensity of positive affect in the moment will be significantly
lower than the mean intensity of forecasted and remembered affect). This is because
the impact bias does not refer to a change of valence in affective forecasts and mem-
ories, but rather a change in the intensity of these (see Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert
Studies in Higher Education 949
2003). Good experiences are imagined to be better and bad experiences are imagined to
be worse, in prospect and retrospect. Thus, the valence of affective experience in the
moment should dictate the nature of any corresponding impact bias. In short, if the
mean affective evaluation of the experience in the moment is positive, then mean fore-
casted and mean remembered affective evaluations may be expected to be even more
positive. Similarly, if the mean affective evaluation of the experience is negative,
then mean forecasted and mean remembered affective evaluations may be expected
to be even more negative.
The adoption of the mean perspective is particularly useful in an HE context, as it
allows for the impact bias to be considered and discussed within the existing paradigm
of student evaluation research, much of which appears to be based on the mean analysis
of evaluation scores (e.g. the UK PTES). However, it is important to acknowledge that,
for experiences that are deemed positive by some but negative by others, the aggregate
impact bias is the product of overestimation in two opposing directions (e.g. happiness
and unhappiness). Thus, there is a theoretical possibility that the impact bias may be
entirely masked in situations where it occurs for positive and negative evaluations in
equal measure. In the HE context, therefore, we recommend that the impact bias
should be analysed first from the mean perspective, and then for positive and negative
evaluations separately, wherever the number of cases in which positive and negative
evaluations are made is sufficient to warrant a separate, statistical analysis. It is
against this background that we formulate the research objectives and hypotheses for
the current study, as will be outlined below.
Research objectives and hypotheses
The impact bias has been examined for (i) emotional reactions to a specific event (e.g.
the outcome of an election; see Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 2003) and (ii) the emotions
felt during an extended experience (e.g. living in a sunnier climate; see Ubel, Loewen-
stein, and Jepson 2005). The emotion studied in these instances is ‘happiness’ – this has
traditionally been used as a proxy for the wider construct of affective well-being in the
social psychology literature (Diener, Scollon, and Lucas 2003). In an HE context,
research has tended to examine how positively or negatively students feel (or in
many cases, think) about their extended experience and specific aspects of it, rather
than exploring generic affective states. (Oldfield and Baron 2000; Brookes 2003).
As our study examines the impact bias in an HE context, it is important to consider
both happiness in general and attitudes towards the educational experience in particular.
The former facilitates clear replication of the impact bias in HE, in a manner previously
revealed in other contexts (i.e. by way of happiness as a global affective judgement).
The latter may reveal impact bias using an approach more meaningful to HE research-
ers, institutions and those tasked with understanding and shaping the student experi-
ence. The explicit requirement for future, past and current students to make affective
judgements about particular aspects of their course also minimises ambiguity as to
the nature of the evaluative task in each group (see Levine et al. 2012; Wilson and
Gilbert 2013).
The master’s courses providing the HE context for our study constitute a multi-epi-
sodic student experience of approximately one year. These episodes include semester-
based taught courses, exams, reading weeks and a dissertation period. Any one such
episode might exert a relatively strong influence on students’ attitudes towards their
overall experience, if it is ongoing (and thus most easily accessible in mind) at the
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point of evaluation (see Schwarz 1998). Against this background, we first set out to
replicate the impact bias in terms of a global affective evaluation (i.e. happiness)
during an extended HE experience (i.e. a master’s degree). For this purpose we formu-
late the following two hypotheses:
H1. Affective forecasts will be of the same valence as reports of affective experience in
the moment (i.e. happy or unhappy), but will be significantly greater in intensity.
H2. Affective memories will be of the same valence as reports of affective experience in
the moment (i.e. happy or unhappy), but will be significantly greater in intensity.
We then examine the impact bias with respect to students’ affective evaluations of the
postgraduate experience, by way of the following hypotheses:
H3. For affective evaluations of the postgraduate experience, forecasts will be of the same
valence as reports made in the moment, but will be significantly greater in intensity.
H4. For affective evaluations of the postgraduate experience, memories will be of the
same valence as reports made in the moment, but will be significantly greater in intensity.
Finally, we examine the impact bias for a discrete episode within the overall postgradu-
ate experience. The episode chosen is the dissertation period, which remains a primary
focus for students when all other aspects of their master’s course are complete. The bulk
of dissertation work begins (in this instance) in July, when most students collect and
analyse data under tutorial supervision. This is defined as the ‘doing stage’ of the dis-
sertation in the UK PTES 2014, and is identified as the point at which 75–86% of post-
graduate students feel positive about their dissertation experience across a variety of
indicators (Soilemetzidis, Bennett, and Leman 2014, 37). Thus, the final two hypoth-
eses are formulated as follows:
H5. For affective evaluations of the dissertation experience, forecasts will be of the same
valence as reports made in the moment, but will be significantly greater in intensity.
H6. For affective evaluations of the dissertation experience, memories will be of the same
valence as reports made in the moment, but will be significantly greater in intensity.
The method by which these hypotheses were tested is described below, prior to the
presentation and discussion of results.
Method
Our study, undertaken in 2012, adopts a between-groups design, which is common in
impact bias research (Gilbert et al. 1998, 2004). The sample totals 360 participants
(male: 34.7%; female: 65.3%) across three groups, incorporating future, current and
past MSc students of a small number of business courses at a UK university. One
hundred and fifteen prospective students (‘forecasters’) were surveyed a week before
the start of their course, and 10 months before the ‘doing stage’ (Soilemetzidis,
Bennett, and Leman 2014, 37) of their dissertation. Seventy current students (‘experi-
encers’) were also surveyed during their course, and specifically at the dissertation
‘doing stage’ in July. Finally, 175 past students (‘rememberers’) were surveyed on
the basis that they had been alumni for between two and five years.
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Participants completed a questionnaire in exchange for a small gift (a non-branded
item to the value of approximately £3). We believe it unlikely that this small token of
appreciation would have influenced results significantly. In all three sample groups,
participants first completed global affective evaluation measures (adapted from
Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 2003), rating how happy they were in the moment com-
pared to on average (1 = far below average happiness, 5 = average happiness, 9 = far
above average happiness). Using the same scale, participants then rated how they
thought they would feel (forecasters), how they have been feeling (experiencers) or
how they thought they had felt (rememberers) at a given point in time. As explained
above, the focal point of evaluation was July, facilitating an examination of affective
evaluations of the postgraduate experience and the dissertation experience specifically.
Participants then completed an 11-point multi-item semantic differential scale,
measuring their affective evaluations of: (a) the postgraduate experience and (b) the dis-
sertation experience (bad/good, unpleasant/pleasant, unsatisfying/satisfying, unreward-
ing/rewarding, worthless/valuable, unstimulating/stimulating, unengaging/engaging,
discouraging/encouraging). These items were generated from a pilot focus group dis-
cussion of how postgraduate and dissertation experiences are affectively evaluated. Stu-
dents participating in the focus group were in the ‘experiencers’ cohort, but did not take
part in the main survey. To minimise potential common method variance (Podsakoff
et al. 2003), the postgraduate experience was rated from −5 to +5, and the dissertation
experience from −3 to +3, on each item, with negative numbers indicating negative
feelings, 0 being neutral and positive numbers indicating positive feelings. Finally, par-
ticipants answered a series of profiling questions (e.g. age, sex and region of origin).
In our between-groups design, a problem could be seen to arise if there are signifi-
cant changes in factors such as teaching personnel, course content, fees, etc. between
forecasters, experiencers and rememberers. As forecasters had little knowledge of
teaching personnel and were subject to the same course content and fee structure as
experiencers (adjusted for inflation), this is less of a concern for revealing prospective
impact bias. However, whilst fees also remained constant in real terms between experi-
encers and rememberers, the degree to which course content changes may have materi-
ally altered the experience of these two groups is difficult to identify.
Such a problem could potentially have been addressed by adopting a within-subject
research design. However, this approach required the tracking of individual students,
posing a threat to participants’ anonymity, the subsequent honesty and openness of
their responses, and the validity of the study. Furthermore, attrition rates across the
three measurement points were likely to be problematic, especially where rememberers
are concerned, as the average response rate to alumni surveys at the study institution is
below 25%. Thus, a between-groups design was selected on the basis that it would
facilitate: (a) an assurance of respondent anonymity, (b) honesty and openness in
responses and (c) a sufficient sample of rememberers.
Results
Results are presented for the three dependent variables of: global affective evaluations
(to test H1 and H2), affective evaluations of the postgraduate experience (to test H3 and
H4) and attitudes towards the dissertation experience (to test H5 and H6). For each
dependent variable, and in line with the rationale outlined earlier, results are presented
first in relation to all data (to assess impact bias from the mean perspective) and second
with respect to positive evaluations only (to assess the positive impact bias). The
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frequency of negative evaluations in our study is insufficient to permit a valid statistical
analysis of the negative impact bias in isolation. This is unsurprising given the rela-
tively low incidence of negatively valenced student evaluations in previous studies
of the student experience (see discussion above). Prior to hypothesis testing, we
present an analysis of group profile variables and their relationship with the dependent
variables.
Group profiles
There are significant differences between groups in terms of age (χ2 (6, 360) = 43.595,
p < .001), with rememberers being older on average than the other groups (as may be
expected). There are also significant differences between groups in terms of gender
balance (χ2 (2, 360) = 33.808, p < .001), with both the forecaster and experiencer
groups exhibiting a female majority, while rememberers are more balanced between
males and females. There is a significant association between group and region of
origin (χ2 (16, 359) = 80.649, p < .001), such that Asians make up a higher proportion
of students in the forecaster and experiencer groups. However, while there are demo-
graphic differences between the groups, none of these are significantly correlated
with the dependent variables. Thus, any significant between-groups differences in
the results below should not be considered to be a product of group demographics.
Global affective evaluations
To control for individual differences in momentary happiness, the current happiness
measure was subtracted from the forecasted, experienced or remembered happiness
measure (with negative numbers indicating below average happiness and positive
numbers indicating above average happiness). This produced a single-item adjusted
global affective evaluation indicator (a technique adopted from Wilson, Meyers, and
Gilbert 2003). A one-way ANOVA was then conducted to compare the difference
between forecasters, experiencers and rememberers on their adjusted global affective
evaluations.
Analysis of the impact bias from the mean perspective (all data)
There is a significant effect of evaluation mode (forecasted/experienced/remembered)
on happiness, F (2, 339.43) = 6.09, p < .01. There is a significant quadratic trend, F
(1, 357) = 10.14, p < .01, indicating that current evaluations of happiness are lower
than forecasted and remembered happiness. Planned comparisons reveal that forecasted
or remembered happiness is significantly greater than current affective evaluations, t
(135.88) = 3.92, p < .01, and that there is no significant difference between forecasters
and rememberers. The results support hypotheses 1 and 2, showing forecasted and
remembered affect to be significantly more positive than that experienced in the moment
by current students (see Figure 2).
Analysis of the positive impact bias (negative evaluations removed)
With the negative responses removed, there is a significant difference between groups
(F (2, 196.218) = 12.236, p < .001) on global affective evaluations. Planned contrasts
and post hoc tests show a significant difference between forecasters and experiencers
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(p < .05) and between experiencers and rememberers (p < .001), with experiencers
exhibiting less intense overall happiness than the other groups. There is no significant
difference between forecasters and rememberers. The results support hypotheses 1 and
2, showing forecasted and remembered affect to be significantly more positive than that
experienced in the moment by current students (see Figure 3).
Affective evaluations of the postgraduate experience
The eight-item semantic differential scale measuring affective evaluations of the post-
graduate experience had high inter-item reliability (α = .97). The scale was therefore
transformed to a single measure. Nineteen outliers were removed. A one-way
ANOVAwas conducted to examine differences between the mean affective evaluations
of forecasters, experiencers and rememberers.
Analysis of the impact bias from the mean perspective (all data)
There is a significant effect of evaluation mode on affective evaluations of the post-
graduate experience, F (2, 252.81) = 20.95, p < .01. There is a significant quadratic
trend, F (1, 338) = 22.60, p < .01, indicating that current students feel less positive
about the postgraduate experience than forecasters or rememberers. Planned contrasts
reveal that current students feel less positive about the postgraduate experience than
forecasters or rememberers, t (94.23) = 4.85, p < .01, and that forecasters feel more
positive about the forthcoming postgraduate experience than rememberers, t
(269.40) = 4.68, p < .01. The results support both hypotheses 3 and 4, such that affec-
tive evaluations of the postgraduate experience are significantly more positive in pro-
spect and retrospect than they are in-the-moment (see Figure 4).
Figure 2. Global affective forecasts, experiences and memories.
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Analysis of the positive impact bias (negative evaluations removed)
With the negative responses removed, there is a significant difference between groups
(F (2, 331) = 19.641, p < .001) in their affective evaluations of the postgraduate experi-
ence. Planned contrasts and post hoc tests show a significant difference between all
groups (p < .01), with positivity highest in forecasters, then rememberers, followed
by experiencers. The results support both hypotheses 3 and 4, such that affective evalu-
ations of the postgraduate experience are significantly more positive in prospect and
retrospect than they are in-the-moment (see Figure 5).
Affective evaluations of the dissertation experience
The same eight-item semantic differential scale as above was used to measure affective
evaluations of the dissertation experience. The scale had high inter-item reliability (α
= .96), and was thus transformed to a single measure. Again, a one-way ANOVA was
conducted to examine differences in the mean affective evaluations of forecasters,
experiencers and rememberers.
Analysis of the impact bias from the mean perspective (all data)
There is a significant effect of evaluation mode on affective evaluations of the disser-
tation experience, F (2, 200.19) = 34.69, p < .01. There is a significant quadratic trend,
F (1, 356) = 52.48, p < .01, indicating that current students feel less positive about the
dissertation experience than forecasters or rememberers. Planned contrasts reveal that
current students feel less positive about the dissertation experience than forecasters
or rememberers, t (89.20) = 6.50, p < .01, and that forecasters feel more positive
about the forthcoming dissertation experience than rememberers, t (285.98) = 5.65,
p < .01. The results support both hypotheses 5 and 6, such that affective evaluations
of the dissertation experience are significantly more positive in prospect and retrospect
than they are in-the-moment (see Figure 6).
Figure 3. Global affective forecasts, experiences and memories (negative evaluations
removed).
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Analysis of the positive impact bias (negative evaluations removed)
With negative responses removed, there is a significant difference between groups
(F (2, 209.288) = 14.833, p < .001) with respect to affective evaluations of the disser-
tation experience. Planned contrasts and post hoc tests show a significant difference
between all groups (p < .01), with positivity highest in forecasters, then rememberers,
followed by experiencers. The results support both hypotheses 5 and 6, such that affec-
tive evaluations of the dissertation experience are significantly more positive in pro-
spect and retrospect than they are in-the-moment (see Figure 7).
Discussion and implications
Our study validates the prospective and retrospective impact bias in the context of HE.
Specifically, in providing support for H1 and H2, the results demonstrate the impact
bias in student evaluations of their affective well-being, and provide evidence that stu-
dents are likely to overestimate the intensity of their emotions (in this case, happiness)
during an extended experience (in this case, the duration of a master’s degree). Further,
we extend the impact bias literature by demonstrating that overestimation can occur not
only in relation to global affective states (e.g. happiness), but also with regard to
specific affective evaluations of the experiences in question. In providing support for
H3, H4, H5 and H6, the results indicate that students are likely to overestimate how
positive they will feel (affective forecasts) and previously felt (affective memories)
about their postgraduate experience and a discrete element of this (i.e. the dissertation
experience).
Given this demonstration of the impact bias in an HE context, the question arises as
to what the implications are for HE management. Specifically, the difficulties that stu-
dents may have in forecasting and remembering their feelings give rise to management
implications in three areas: (i) the effectiveness of student decision-making, (ii) the
timing and comparability of course evaluations and (iii) the nature and impact of
word-of-mouth communications about the HE experience.
Figure 4. Forecasts, experiences and memories of affective attitudes towards the overall post-
graduate experience.
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Influencing the effectiveness of student decision-making
Themost documented implication of the impact bias in prospect is that it reduces people’s
ability to make decisions that will maximise their future happiness (see Wilson and
Gilbert 2005). In an HE context this may extend to all of the choices that students
make before and during their student experience (e.g. choosing a university, a course, a
place to live, electivemodules, etc.). The central issue here is the tendency to overestimate
in prospect; a notion that suggests experiences are, as a matter of course, unlikely to be as
good or as bad as forecasted. For this reason, experimental efforts to address the impact
bias have universally focused on altering the estimation of future emotional responses
(rather than altering the intensity of affective states in-the-moment). This has been
achieved by reducing the degree to which participants engage in focalism – or ‘de-focus-
ing’participants– at thepoint atwhich they are asked tomake affective forecasts (as docu-
mented by Sanna and Schwarz 2004; Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson 2005).
Such de-focusing activities might be applied in schools, colleges and universities to
improve the emotional utility of key decisions that prospective and current students are
regularly required to make. This may be as simple as encouraging students to visualise,
in a structured way, the variety of factors (programme-related and otherwise) that might
impact their emotional state at a future point in time (e.g. class size, friendships, co-cur-
ricular activities, travelling, living arrangements, etc.).
In this manner, the deployment of de-focusing activities could enhance the support
and guidance provided to students ahead of their decision to engage in a particular pro-
gramme, course or activity. Similarly, de-focusing activities could also be implemented
to assist students who are unhappy or dissatisfied with their current situation to more
accurately evaluate the relative attractiveness of alternative options (e.g. leaving univer-
sity, changing courses, etc.). Finally, with regard to aspects of the student experience
that are expected to be negative, de-focusing might also be justified on the grounds
that diminishing the impact bias may reduce unnecessary worry and anxiety about
future situations (see Wilson and Gilbert 2005).
Figure 5. Forecasts, experiences and memories of affective attitudes towards the overall post-
graduate experience (negative evaluations removed).
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Timing and comparability of course evaluations
In addition to the implications of the impact bias for student decision-making, HE man-
agers should be aware of it when administering, analysing and interpreting student
evaluation surveys, particularly with respect to evaluation timing and comparability.
In terms of the former, the impact bias suggests that course evaluations undertaken
before a course is finished are likely to differ from those gathered afterwards. If, for
example, online course evaluation questionnaires are open for an extended period –
overlapping teaching, post-teaching and, possibly, post-assessment – then the results
are likely to be from students at different points on the impact bias curve. Even if stu-
dents are being evaluated purely on the basis of their (domain) satisfaction with course
events (rather than their affective response to these events), the impact bias can still
indirectly influence such cognitive judgements (of satisfaction) because how people
feel, or remember feeling, feeds into how and what they think (see Diener, Scollon,
and Lucas 2003; Chong and Ahmed 2015). A cynical perspective might therefore
involve capitalising on the impact bias to manipulate the timing of course evaluations
to give more positive results, although ultimately this would not lead to long-term insti-
tutional gain or improvements in students’ experiences and affective well-being.
However, this is not to say the timing of evaluation surveys does not matter; indeed
the impact bias renders timing especially important around issues of evaluation compar-
ability. Specifically, HE managers and academics should be careful when making com-
parisons between course evaluation results, without first considering the time elapsed
between the event/experience in question and the point at which it is evaluated, and
how this may differ between courses or students.
Nature and impact of word-of-mouth communication
Finally, the findings of this study may have HE marketing implications, particularly for
understanding the changing nature of word-of-mouth communication over time. In a
social media environment students have many opportunities to review and recommend
Figure 6. Forecasts, experiences and memories of affective attitudes towards the dissertation
experience.
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courses and institutions, both after and during their student experience. The impact bias
could radically alter the nature of word-of-mouth communication across these two
points in time. Put simply: recommendations that are made after the student experience
will be based on, or informed by, more intense feelings (positive or negative) than those
made during the experience itself. Thus, bad experiences become very bad, and good
experiences become very good, in retrospect. For HE managers, therefore, the effec-
tiveness of positive word-of-mouth activity as a pure recruitment and promotional
tool may be most evident when it originates from rememberers. This indicates the
benefits of mobilising and engaging alumni for marketing a course through word-of-
mouth recommendations. However, should the primary objective be to improve the
accuracy of affective forecasting and subsequent decision-making amongst prospective
students, then the broader and tempered word-of-mouth reviews of current students
could be of value as a de-focusing tool (see above).
Recommendations for further research
We have noted previously that the impact bias appears to be a particularly robust
phenomenon that occurs across a very wide range of contexts. As such, the results
of the current study may be expected to generalise to other courses, disciplines, insti-
tutions and any aspect of the educational experience that students are required to evalu-
ate. However, it would be helpful for further research to engage in replication of the
current findings in other HE contexts (e.g. in relation to a wider range of courses, dis-
ciplines and student experiences).
Given that the great majority of participants reported positive evaluations in the
current study, our analysis is necessarily limited to the positive impact bias. Whilst
it may be relatively uncommon for prospective students to anticipate negative
emotional experiences during a course they are about to undertake (as evidenced
by previous academic research, the UK PTES and our study), it is certainly not
out of the question. A specific investigation of the existence, nature and
Figure 7. Forecasts, experiences and memories of affective attitudes towards the dissertation
experience (negative evaluations removed).
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consequences of the negative impact bias in such cases would constitute a useful
extension of our work. Further research may also be undertaken to examine the
durability aspect of the impact bias in an HE context; i.e. to explore the expected,
perceived and remembered duration for which emotional responses persist in
relation to certain aspects of the student experience (e.g. leaving home and begin-
ning university life).
Three further issues for future research may emerge from a broader critical perspec-
tive. First, it may be useful to consider the relationship between affective states and aca-
demic performance. For example, there is an ongoing debate in the HE sector as to
whether student satisfaction, and indeed happiness, is positively correlated with effec-
tive learning and intellectual development (see Furedi 2012). Second, in the social
psychological tradition of impact bias research it has been assumed that affective
scales provide a valid measure of affective experience (Gilbert et al. 1998, 2004;
Wilson et al. 2000; Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 2003; Meyvis, Ratner, and Levav
2010). However, this raises the question of whether this is the case in the context of
HE. As a means of examining the extent to which scale-based evaluations reflect uni-
versity students’ lived experience, further qualitative research is recommended to
explore the nature, intensity and stability of their affective expectations, experiences
and memory. Finally, our study suggests the need for a wider and more detailed inves-
tigation into questionnaire surveys as a suitable means of evaluating students’ experi-
ences and feelings. Impact bias, it would seem, presents yet another potential
methodological concern regarding such instruments, adding to previously identified
issues such as response bias (Richardson 2012) and differing student interpretations
of survey questions (Bennett and Kane 2014).
Conclusion
In summary, and in response to calls in the literature for a greater focus on understand-
ing the affective experience of students in the context of their expectations (Miller,
Bender, and Schuh 2005; Beard, Clegg, and Smith 2007), our paper validates and
extends previous demonstrations of the impact bias in an HE context. There are
many definitions of the student experience, but it is difficult to imagine that the relation-
ship between affective forecasts, experience and memory is not consistently a central
aspect. We show evidence of the impact bias with regard to postgraduate students’
affective evaluations of their general happiness and, also, their postgraduate and disser-
tation experiences.
The impact bias may have important implications for student decision-making,
timing and comparability of course evaluations, and the nature and impact of word-
of-mouth communication. Ultimately, it provides an important reminder that as
human beings we have a tendency towards overly optimistic (or overly pessimistic)
views of the future and the past. An appreciation of the inevitability of this is critical
to understanding and managing students throughout their HE journey, and beyond.
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